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BIDDING MODELS: TESTING THE STATIONARITY 
ASSUMPTION 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
With notably few exceptions, bidding models contain probability distributions with 
parameters that are assumed to be fixed, or stationary, over time.  Some methods of 
method of testing the tenability of this assumption are examined and applied to eight 
datasets.  Of particular interest is the statistical significance of two types of 
periodicity; (1) that bidders gradually reduce their bids prior to winning a contract and 
(2) that bidders have periods in which they are more competitive and periods in which 
they are less competitive.  To test (1), McCaffer and Pettitt’s (1976) cusum method is 
used and shown to have a limited interpretation in this context.  McCaffer’s ‘deficit’ 
statistic is then used in conjunction with a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
and shows (1) to be untenable for the samples involved.  To test (2), the deficit 
statistic is again used with an ANOVA to examine all possible sub series of bids. 
 
Keywords: bidding, behaviour, parameters, cusum method, deficit statistic. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
The data demands of bidding models are such that a trade-off is needed between the 
flexibility of the models and the accuracy of the estimates of the parameters of the 
models.  Apart from a few notable exceptions (Beeston, 1983; Morin & Clough 1969) 
this has resulted in models being built on the assumption that bidder’s behave in a 
consistent, if probabilistic, way over a reasonably long period of time regardless of 
changing conditions (Runeson and Skitmore 1999).  In particular, stationarity is 
assumed, that is that the probability distributions used to model the bids have 
parameters whose values are fixed over this time.  The tenability of this assumption 
has been questioned on theoretical grounds – standard economic theory predicts that, 
for example, changing workloads and market conditions must have a destabilising 
influence over time (Flanagan & Norman, 1984; Harris & McCaffer 1983:219; 
Runeson and Skitmore 1999) – and it is likely that new models will be needed if real-
world bidding offers a significant departure 
 
Whether or not the stationarity assumption is reasonable in practice is likely to 
depend on several factors.  One is the extensive use of subcontracting in the industry, 
which protects main contractors to some extent from workload problems.  Another is 
that the conditions of uncertainty involved in estimating both price and cost levels 
may make significant systematic adjustments in competitive behaviour difficult, if not 
impossible.  Of the little empirical research to date aimed at establishing the extent to 
which stationarity exists in practice, Skitmore (1981,1987) and Rawlinson and 
Raftery (1997) have identified some significant yearly changes in the moments of the 
overall aggregated distribution of bids – suggesting these to be associated with market 
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conditions.  At the level of the individual firm, views seem to be mixed.  Shash 
(1993), for example, found “the need for work” to be one of the biggest factors 
influencing the bid/no bid decision.  Ahmad and Minkarah (1988), on the other hand, 
give no mention of this.  Meanwhile, Griffis’ (1992:153) personal experience is that 
the “volume on hand (backlog, work on hand) is a major influence on the utility that a 
building contractor places on a particular bid letting” although he does admit this to 
“have not been proven by the writer … [and providing] fruit for further consideration 
and research” (Griffis 1992:164). 
 
In fact, one study of individual bidders was reported as early as 1976.  This is by 
McCaffer and Pettitt (1976), in which they examined a set of 185 contracts for 
building work and 350 contracts for roadwork.  This involved the use of the statistics, 
by large clients, to identify 'outliers' in a set of bids thereby rejecting low bids that 
could be demonstrated to be unbelievable low.   To do this, they looked at the 
competitiveness of individual contractors through each’s mean bid levels, during the 
course of which: 
 
It was noticed that some companies, for a year or so, would be consistently bidding 
low and then would be bidding high for the remainder of the time, thus exhibiting 
two types of behaviour, which in the long run looked average.  A method which 
should recognise this behaviour is the calculation of cumulative sums (cusums) of 
((bid/mean bid)-1).  If a company is consistently bidding below the mean bid, then 
((bid/mean bid)-1) will be negative and the cusum will drift away from the zero line 
in a negative direction.  If the company then starts to bid above the mean bid, then 
the cusum will change direction and drift in a positive direction.  Thus, one can see 
at a glance whether a company is behaving competitively (cusum drifting in a 
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negative direction) or not (cusum drifting in a positive direction).  We expect 
winning bids to come after a downward drift, which will then be followed by an 
upward drift, as the company is not so eager to gain a contract … This technique is 
useful in identifying the companies which are eager to win contracts by offering 
lower than average bids at a given time.  In Table 2, we give the number of times a 
winning bid was preceded by a fall of a given number of increments in the 
contractor’s cusum value. (p.6) 
 
Percentage of the total number of 
winning bids preceded by a fall of ‘M’ 
increments in the contractors’ cusum 
value (%) 
Number of increments 
(i.e., previous bids) 
(‘M’) 
85 2 
75 3 
69 4 
65 5 
McCaffer and Pettitt’s Table 2 
 
In a further publication (Harris and McCaffer 1983:236) concerning the same data is 
added “An analysis of this type for some 600 contracts involving almost 400 
contractors showed that there were only 15% of cases when the winning bidder had a 
rising graph preceding his winning bid [while] conversely there were 85% of cases 
when the winning bidder had a declining graph”, with the original Table 2 above 
being presented again as a summary of the results.  Although no statistics are 
provided concerning the significance or otherwise of this result, it is clearly 
impressive1.   
                                                 
1 Since then, similar results have also been obtained in Yiin’s (1987) study of subcontractors. 
 5
 
In yet another paper (McCaffer 1976), McCaffer uses what he terms a ‘deficit’ 
statistic, that is the percentage difference between the contractor’s bid and the lowest 
opposing bid.  This was subjected to a variety of tests for randomness of his Belgian 
data leading to the eventual conclusion “that contractors bidding behaviour can be 
regarded as random” (p3) 
 
Here, we describe the analysis of eight disparate datasets to test the general tenability 
of the stationarity assumption by answering the question “Do contractors’ bids 
commonly change systematically over a period of time or are they little different from 
random?”  In particular, we develop methods of checking the statistical significance 
of the periodicity involved.  To do this we first start with McCaffer and Pettitt’s 
cusum method and show it to have a limited interpretation in terms of a measure of 
progress towards producing the winning bid.  We then use McCaffer’s ‘deficit’ 
statistic in a more direct method which is designed to demonstrate the phenomenon 
more clearly and show that winning bids are not in general preceded by increasingly 
more competitive bids.  This method of analysis is then extended to the various sub 
series involved and, for the data used, it is shown that bids do seem to group together on 
occasions.  However, rather than confirming McCaffer and Pettitt’s observation that 
there may be two types of bidding behaviour involved, they appear to be more due to 
the presence of a very few outliers than a continuing trend.  
 
 
CUSUM ANALYSIS 
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Datasets 
 
The data needed for the analysis are difficult to obtain for, as Griffis (1992) points out, 
there is nothing to gain and everything to lose for a bidder to allow his bidding trends to 
be analysed by competitors.  Nevertheless, six datasets were obtained from existing data 
sources for the cusum analysis.  These are summarised in Table1.  The first three sets are 
from Skitmore (1986) and comprise (1) a full set of bids made by a single medium-large 
size London construction company over a 12 month period in the early 1980s, (2) a full 
set of bids for all the contracts of a North of England local council over a three-year 
period again in the early 1980s and (3) a full set of bids for all the contracts in the Great 
London area collected over a three month period commencing late 1976.  The fourth 
dataset is for a full set of bids for all the building contracts let by a USA Government 
Aerospace Agency from 1976 to 1984, while the fifth dataset is for a single USA 
contractor in the late 1960s and published in Shaffer and Micheau (1971).  The data for 
the Shaffer and Micheau’s bidder did not constitute all of the work for which he 
competed during the period but they were for all the projects for which the contractor 
collected such data.  40% of the bids were made in one year – a year in which the 
contractor initiated an in-depth study of his bidding practices.  The sixth dataset 
comprised more recent data obtained from the Hong Kong Architectural Services 
Department for their building contract bids from 1990 to 1996.  Apart from the 
Shaffer and Micheau data, nothing is known of any changing conditions that may 
have occurred during the periods to which the data relate. 
 
The bids analysed comprised single most recorded bidder from each dataset.  Therefore, 
although it is not known how many other contracts were bid during the period by the 
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contractor concerned, it is likely that nearly all, if not all, his bids for the period are being 
examined.  The original contract sequence numbers are retained as an indication of the 
frequency of the contractors’ bidding record for the particular client/owner involved.  In 
the analysis that follows, the term “winning bid” is taken to mean the lowest bid in the 
auction. 
 
 
Results 
 
The results of the cusum analysis are shown in Fig 1.  The circles represent the cusum 
values for the bidder concerned, with the closed circles representing winning bids.  Fig1a 
shows the results for the Skitmore 1 bidder, who generally bids slightly above the mean 
bid.  The Skitmore 2 bidder (Fig 1b), on the other hand, having bid competitively for the 
first 60 contracts in the database, then bids generally above the mean bid for the next 60 
contracts, only to resume bidding competitively thereafter – seemingly offering clear 
evidence of McCaffer and Pettitt’s assertion that some bidder’s trends do change over 
time.  The Skitmore 3 bidder also seems to change trend over time, with a trail of more 
competitive bids during the earlier phase of the period but fluctuating quite wildly in the 
second half of the period.  The USA Govt bidder (Fig 1d) likewise appears to have a 
different trend in the second half of the series.  Closer inspection, however, suggests that 
all that is really different is two bids in the middle of the series.  These move the graph 
line substantially upwards from whence the trend continues virtually as before.  Shaffer 
and Micheau’s bidder (Fig 1e) has a similar disjointed trend, perhaps coinciding with the 
change in bidding policy noted above.  However, it is again the influence of 3 or 4 bids in 
the middle of the series that gives this impression of disjointedness rather than any real 
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change in overall trend.  Finally, the Hong Kong bidder appears to exhibit the most 
consistent trend of all, with a gently down sloping graph indicating consistent bidding 
below the mean bid for each contract. 
 
The top half of Table 2 summarises the results of the cusum analysis.  This shows the 
number of times the cusum value of previous bids fell prior to a winning bid.  For 
example, of the six occasions the Skitmore 1 bidder had won a contract, his cusum value 
had fallen four times on the previous bid, one time on the previous two bids and one time 
on the previous 5 bids (the figures in brackets show the cumulative results).  The 
equivalent percentage figures are also shown for comparison with McCaffer and Pettitt’s 
results.  The Hong Kong results are not shown as nearly all the bidder’s cusum values fell 
throughout the whole series. 
 
 
Comment 
 
Although at first sight, the cusum values do seem to highlight trends and changes in 
trends in bidding behaviour, it is clear from the above commentary that they need careful 
interpretation.  For at least two of the bidders, what appears to be a dramatic change in 
trend is just the effect of a tiny few bids rather than a change in trend.  Also, as the 
cusums only reflect bids below the mean bid, a contractor (such as the Hong Kong 
contractor) entering bids consistently below the mean bid2 is virtually impossible to 
analyse in terms of counting the number of times the cusum value drops prior to a 
                                                 
2 Such asymmetric behaviour is not unexpected for construction contracts (Bajari 1997; Bajari & Ye 
2000) as some firms are better managed than others for “a variety of other reasons” (Bajari 2001:2), 
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winning bid.  McCaffer’s ‘deficit’ statistic, on the other hand, would seem to offer less 
chance of a result that is an artefact of the statistic as it measures the departure from the 
main bid of interest, the lowest bid, instead of the mean bid.  This is examined in the next 
section. 
 
 
DEFICIT ANALYSIS 
 
A simpler and more informative approach is to use McCaffer’s ‘deficit’ value, which 
is just the percentage the bid is above the lowest bid divided by 100.  By comparing 
the bidder’s mean deficit values for the ultimate bids immediately prior to the winning 
bid with the bidder’s mean deficit values for penultimate bids, etc., it is possible to 
assess the degree of downward drift for individual contractors.  Fig 2 provides the 
results of the ‘deficit’ analysis.  The bidding patterns now become clearer, with the 
Skitmore 1 bidder being less than 0.3 on all except two occasions.  Using the 0.3 value as 
a guideline, the Skitmore 2 bidder can now be seen to have clear periods of highly 
competitive bidding, with several instances of large amounts of ‘money left on the table’, 
and 11 uncompetitive bids (e.g., around contract 80).  Also, the Skitmore 3 bidder can 
now be seen to really only have a few ‘wild’ bids, one of which wins the contract with 
nearly 25% money left on the table!  Likewise, the USA Govt Agency bidder also has 
two ‘wild’ uncompetitive bids prior to a winning bid, while the Shaffer and Micheau 
bidder has four ‘wild’ uncompetitive bids, three of which are grouped together, again in 
the likely period of transition for that firm.  The Hong Kong bidder records nine ‘wild’ 
uncompetitive bids, several of which are quite close to each other. 
                                                                                                                                            
and has been demonstrated empirically (eg., Flanagan & Norman 1984; Skitmore 1991; Drew & 
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All in all, the general impression here is that the ‘wild’ uncompetitive bids are not 
entirely random and it is possible that they may be ‘cover prices’3.  To see the extent to 
which the bidders are gradually converging on the winning bid, Table 2 gives the 
equivalent counts of the ‘deficit’ to the cusum situation.  These can be tested for 
significance by a chi-square test (see Appendix for details).  This shows no statistically 
significant trend to exist. 
 
As an alternative, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) can be used for this test.  
This is likely to be more powerful as it uses more of the information available.  Table 3 
summarises the results.  This includes two additional datasets (1) Benjamin’s (1969) 
series of 130 USA building contracts bid by his contractor over the period 1965-68 and 
(2) McCaffer and Pettitt’s (1976) first Belgian contractor’s series of 78 bids for public 
works contracts over the period 1971-74.  The Table shows the mean and standard 
deviation of the ‘deficit’ values of the bid preceding a winning bid, the number of these 
bids (N) and the associated ANOVA p value.  For example, the Skitmore 1 bidder has 
won 6 contracts (level 0) with a mean deficit bid of –0016272 (0.010646 standard 
deviation).  On each of these six occasions, the deficit value of the bidder’s preceding bid 
(level 1) had a mean of 0.099582 (0.088774 standard deviation).  On one of these six 
occasions, the second last bid was a winning bid also, leaving five second last bids for 
analysis.  These five second last bids had a mean deficit value of 0.049248 (0.24781 
standard deviation), etc.  The ANOVA tests for a significant difference between the 
mean deficit value of the last bid and the mean deficit value of the second last bid.  In 
                                                                                                                                            
Skitmore 1997). 
3 Defined as “… where a bidder enters a bid the value of which is advised by a competitor” (Skitmore 
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other words, the probability that 0.099582 and 0.049248 are from the same 
population.  In this case, the probability is 0.254 which, although less than even 
chance, are not significant at the conventional 0.05 cut-off level.  Similarly, the 
probability that the last, second last and third last mean deficit values are from the 
same population is 0.540, so again the differences are not significant.  Looking 
through the results, it is clear that there are no significant differences, even at the 0.20 
cut-off level. 
 
Fig 3 shows the result of pooling the deficit values for (a) each and every level and 
(b) last and second last levels, and fitting a 3-degree polynomial regression equation.  
In both cases, the regression curve is shown to be virtually horizontal, again 
confirming any lack of trend with the data. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The deficit statistic is rather more helpful than the cusum statistic in both observing and 
analysing bidding trends.  In particular, it is shown that ‘wild’ bids do seem to group 
together on occasions.  McCaffer and Pettitt’s second observation, however, that winning 
bids are preceded by increasingly more competitive bids, is not supported. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF DEFICIT SUBSERIES 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1989:175) 
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To examine McCaffer and Pettitt’s first observation further, i.e., that there may be two 
types of bidding behaviour involved, the data for each case were divided into sub series 
and the sub series’ means checked for significance by one-way ANOVA.  This was done 
exhaustively for m=2, 3 and 4 sub series.  For example, the Skitmore 1 contractor has a 
main series of 51 deficit values.  We first divide these into two sub series groups, one 
containing two values and one containing the remaining 49 values.  The means of each 
sub series was then calculated and the one-way ANOVA p value found.  Another two 
sub series were then formed, with the first containing three values and the other 
containing the remaining 48 values.  The one-way ANOVA p was again found.  This was 
repeated until one-way ANOVA p values had been obtained for all possible pairs of sub 
series.  The pair of sub series with the lowest p value was then noted.  This was 5.28e-02 
and occurred when the first and second sub series contained 25 and 26 values.  These had 
a mean of 0.057 (0.057 sd) and 0.128 (0.170) respectively.  The process was then 
repeated for all possible sub series triples.  This time the lowest p value was found to be 
2.06e-06, for the first, second and third sub series containing 37, 2 and 12 values.  The 
means of these sub series are 0.073 (0.070 sd), 0.511 (0.492) and 0.086 (0.088 sd) 
respectively.  Table 4 summarises the results for all the datasets. 
 
As the method of selecting the sub series is non-random, the one-way ANOVA p values 
overestimate the true probabilities involved.  To gain a first approximation of the correct 
probabilities, a Monte Carlo simulation was used.  This involved generating simulated 
random values from a normal distribution with the same two first moments as the actual 
deficit values.  For the Skitmore 1 data, therefore, 51 simulated deficit values were 
generated and subjected to the same analysis as above.  This was repeated 100 times to 
obtain a distribution of lowest p values and the 5th lowest value was then chosen to 
 13
represent the fifth percentile.  These simulated five percent cut-off value are also shown 
in Table 4 for comparison with the lowest p value recorded from the actual data.  
Naturally, in the event of the lowest p value for the actual data being less than the lowest 
p value from the simulated data, the difference between the associated sub series means 
was regarded as being significant.  Table 4 shows these highlighted in bold text.  
 
In examining Table 4, it is now clear that there are significant differences in the mean 
deficit values of the sub series’ of six of the eight datasets.  In several cases, these seem 
to be due to just a few unusual, or wild, bids.  Rather less frequently, as with McCaffer 
and Pettitt’s bidder, there are several quite lengthy adjacent sub series involved.  Also, 
the midpoint break in Shaffer and Micheau’s bidder is clearly identified. 
 
 
Outliers 
 
Table 5 summarises the effects of removing outliers.  Of the six bidders affected, the 
removal of the single most top deficit value for three bidders, Skitmore 1, USA Govt and 
Shaffer and Micheau, is sufficient to render the means of the resulting best sub series 
statistically insignificant.  Removal of the top two deficit values had the same effect for 
the McCaffer & Pettitt bidder.  For the Hong Kong bidder, a group of four of the highest 
deficit values occurred between two winning bids – indicating a very short period of 
highly uncompetitive bidding.  Removing these, together with a single outlier from 
elsewhere in the full series, again made the sub series’ mean values statistically 
insignificant.  Finally, for the Skitmore 2 bidder, a lengthy sub series of 15 deficit values 
were found with a significantly high mean value.  In fact, this sub series (bids 20-34) 
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contained five of the six highest deficit values in the whole series.  This same bidder also 
recorded four successive wins - making yet another significant sub series.  This series 
was therefore the most difficult to homogenise – requiring the removal of ten bids to 
avoid the best sub series of deficit values having significantly different means. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In testing the stationarity assumption, i.e., that individual bidding behaviour does not 
change over time, we have concentrated here on the two behaviour types proposed by 
McCaffer and Pettitt, i.e., that (1) winning bids come after a downward drift and (2) 
companies consistently bid low for some periods and then high in other periods.  In 
doing this we have looked at the series of bidding data for six individual bidders, 
where all the bids for each contract are known, together with the identity of the 
associated bidders.  This has been supplemented, where possible, with two further 
series of bids from individual bidders where only the value of the bidder’s bid and 
lowest bid is known.  The series’ come from a variety of time periods, ranging from 
mid 1960s to 1990s, and countries, comprising UK (3), USA (3), Belgium (1) and 
Hong Kong (1).  Of these, only two (Skitmore 1 and Benjamin) are a ‘pure’ series, 
having been collected from individual contractors – the remainder are for the most 
frequent bidders in a larger set of data obtained from client/owners or bidding 
agencies and therefore not guaranteed to be entirely complete. 
 
In considering behaviour type (1), it was shown that McCaffer and Pettitt’s cusum 
method is not very informative, especially where the bidder is relatively competitive.  
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A simpler and more informative approach was developed here using McCaffer’s 
‘deficit’ values, which is just the percentage the bid is above the lowest bid divided by 
100.  By comparing the bidder’s mean deficit values for the ultimate bids immediately 
prior to the winning bid with the bidder’s mean deficit values for penultimate bids, 
etc., it is shown that there is no significant downward drift for any of the individual 
contractors examined. 
 
For behaviour type (2), we have developed the deficit analysis further to test all 
possible sub series of m=2,3,4 values.  This has shown that sub series’ with 
significantly different mean values do exist for six of the eight bidders analysed.  In 
examining this further though, it is shown that, for three of these six bidders, the 
significant differences can be removed by simply eliminating the highest deficit value 
in their whole series.  For another bidder, the same effect was achieved by eliminating 
the two highest values.  Of the two remaining bidders, one was found to have a group 
of four of the highest deficit values occurring between two winning bids – indicating a 
very short period of very highly uncompetitive bidding.  Removing these, together with a 
single outlier from elsewhere in the full series, again made the difference between the sub 
series’ mean values statistically insignificant.  For the remaining bidder, a lengthy sub 
series of 15 deficit values were found with a significantly high mean value.  In fact, this 
sub series (bids 20-34) contained five of the six highest deficit values in the bidder’s 
whole series.  This same bidder also recorded four successive wins, making yet another 
significant sub series. This series was therefore the most difficult to homogenise – 
requiring the removal of ten bids to avoid the best sub series of deficit values having 
significantly different means. 
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For the data used, the tests indicate that both type (1) and (2) behaviours do not occur 
frequently for construction contract bidders.  For further testing, it may be possible to 
utilise some of the more standard treatments in, say, ARIMA modelling to identify 
specific types of trends.  An alternative would be to follow McCaffer’s (1976) approach 
in examining, for example, general departures from randomness by autocorrelation tests. 
 
As Runeson & Skitmore (1999) have commented, stationarity is a vital assumption in the 
decision theoretic approach to bidding and serious violations of this assumption will be 
fatal to the approach as it is currently structured.  What is less clear is the point at which 
such violations can be regarded as ‘serious’.  The existence of non-stationarity is not a 
new issue in the general literature.  Economic time series, for example, as Ploberger and 
Phillips (2001:169) observe, “are often non-stationary … and there is good reason to 
believe that the trending mechanism is stochastic.  However, [for econometric analysis] 
the precise form of the non-stationarity is not so much of an issue.”  Whether this will be 
true also for bidding modelling has yet to be determined although, for the data used, the 
analysis presented in this paper suggests that this may well be the case in practice. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Chi square test for ‘deficit’ method 
 
Skitmore 1 data 
 
Expected frequency for m=1 is n/2, m=2 is n/4, m≥ 3 is n/4.  So, for Skitmore 1 data, 
E1= 6/2=3, E2= 6/4=1.5, E3= 6/4=1.5.  That is 
 
( ) ( ) 6667..0
5.1
4/1
5.1
4/13/1
5.1
5.11
5.1
5.11
3
)34( 2222 =++=−+−+−=X  
 
This value of X2 is not significant at the 5% level, when tested as a 2 )2(χ  variable (for 
p<0.05, 99.52 )2( >χ ). 
 
 
Skitmore 2 data 
 
Ignoring m=0, ( ) ( ) 3333..0
25.2
25.22
25.2
25.23
5.4
)5.44( 2222 =−+−+−=X , which again is 
not significant. 
 
 
Skitmore 3 data 
 
( ) ( ) 6667.2
25.1
25.11
25.1
25.12
5.2
)5.22( 2222 =−+−+−=X  which is again not significant. 
 
 
USA Govt data 
 
( ) ( ) 6.0
5.1
5.11
5.1
5.11
3
)34( 2222 =−+−+−=X  (not significant) 
 
 
Shaffer and Micheau data 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2.1
25.1
25.12
25.1
25.12
5.2
5.22
5
)54( 22222 =−+−+−+−=X  (not significant, for p<0.05, 
81.72 )3( >χ ). 
 
 
Hong Kong data 
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( ) ( ) ( ) 1.0
125.1
125.11
125.1
125.11
25.2
25.22
5.4
)5.45( 22222 =−+−+−+−=X  (not significant). 
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Fig 1c: Skitmore 3
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Fig 1d: USA Govt Agency
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Fig 1e: Shaffer & Micheau
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Fig 1f: Hong Kong data
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Fig 2a: Skitmore 1
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Fig 2b: Skitmore 2
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Fig 2c: Skitmore 3
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Fig 2d: USA Govt Agency
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Fig 2e: Shaffer & Micheau
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Fig 2f: Hong Kong data
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Fig 3a: Pooled deficit values
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Fig 3b: Pooled deficit analysis for last and second last bids
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Data set Source Type Period No of contracts 
1 Skitmore (1986) London building contracts 1981-82 51 
2 Skitmore (1986) North of England public works contracts 1979-82 76 
3 Skitmore (1986) London building contracts 1976-77 57 
4 Brown (1986) USA Govt agency building contracts 1976-84 32 
5 Shaffer & Micheau (1987) USA building contracts 1965-69 48 
6 Drew (2000) Hong Kong Govt building contracts 1990-96 101 
 Table 1: Cusum bidding data 
 16
 
 
Skitmore 1 Skitmore 2 Skitmore 3 USA Govt Agency 
Shaffer & 
Micheau Hong Kong Method 
No % No % No % No % No % No % 
m=1 4 (6) 100 5 (13) 100 6 (12) 100 4 (5) 100 5 (10) 100   
m=2 1 (2) 33 4 (8) 62 4 (6) 50 1 (1) 20 3 (5) 50   
m=3 - (1) 17 1 (4) 31 1 (2) 17 - 0 - (2) 20   
m=4 - (1) 17 1 (3) 23 - (1) 8 - 0 - (2) 20   
m=5 1 (1) 17 1 (2) 15 1 (1) 8 - 0 - (2) 20   
m=6 - 0 - (1) 8 - 0 - 0 1 (2) 20   
C
U
SU
M
 
m=7 - 0 1 (1) 8 - 0 - 0 1 (1) 10   
m=0 - - 4 (13) 100 - - - - -  -  
m=1 4 (6) 100 4 (9) 69 6 (12) 100 2 (5) 100 4 (10) 100 5 (9) 100 
m=2 1 (2) 33 3 (5) 38 5 (6) 50 2 (3) 60 2 (6) 60 2 (4) 44 
m=3 1 (1) 17 2 (2) 15 1 (1) 8 1 (1) 20 2 (4) 40 1 (2) 22 D
E
FI
C
IT
 
m=4 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 2 (2) 20 1 (1) 11 
Table 2: Previous falling bids (cumulative value in brackets) 
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Preceding 
bid N Means Std.Dev. 
ANOVA 
p 
Preceding 
bid N Means Std.Dev. 
ANOV
A p 
Skitmore 1     Shaffer & Micheau     
0 6 -.016272 .010646 - 0 10 -.025581 .023543 - 
1 6 .099582 .088774 - 1 8 .083171 .052002 - 
2 5 .049248 .024781 0.254 2 7 .158450 .150639 0.206 
3 4 .092763 .098434 0.540 3 5 .087442 .103315 0.367 
4 4 .084060 .046671 0.690 4 4 .174403 .218783 0.536 
5 4 .263988 .396922 0.452 5 3 .050020 .054416 0.526 
     6 3 .191670 .193850 0.576 
Skitmore 2     7 2 .093585 .104645 0.674 
0 13 -.101176 .076207 - 8 2 .067555 .050169 0.720 
1 9 .102396 .074512 - 9 2 .027765 .002906 0.693 
2 6 .128972 .115907 0.595      
3 5 .168090 .087943 0.453 Hong Kong     
4 4 .055340 .061236 0.289 0 10 -.035832 .046077 - 
5 2 .128885 .160054 0.473 1 9 .178650 .215341 - 
6 1 .124520 - - 2 9 .099113 .088083 0.320 
7 1 .550140 - - 3 8 .143379 .146713 0.577 
8 1 .159690 - - 4 7 .160184 .095010 0.708 
9 1 .152850 - - 5 6 .137323 .131523 0.832 
10 1 .217330 - - 6 5 .067162 .039061 0.707 
11 1 .085680 - - 7 5 .081146 .034686 0.780 
12 1 .165620 - - 8 4 .133668 .053084 0.750 
     9 4 .129183 .041837 0.806 
Skitmore 3          
0 12 -.063744 .069521  Benjamin     
1 10 .072842 .034219  0 20 -.025442 .031367 - 
2 9 .115379 .155273 0.409 1 17 .102320 .095253 - 
3 7 .093180 .083934 0.674 2 15 .074585 .048894 0.318 
4 6 .140853 .090017 0.594 3 14 .089888 .069384 0.583 
5 4 .083270 .028453 0.691 4 12 .096785 .104871 0.804 
6 2 .168755 .050084 0.658 5 10 .050117 .048901 0.494 
7 2 .208220 .250570 0.585 6 9 .058944 .052380 0.473 
8 1 .032210 - - 7 8 .087341 .061410 0.575 
9 1 .069420 - - 8 7 .106621 .063474 0.593 
10 1 .198550 - - 9 7 .062506 .048593 0.606 
     10 4 .052985 .035324 0.616 
USA Govt      11 3 .141107 .105188 0.535 
0 5 -.073898 .054214 - 12 2 .143720 .130094 0.522 
1 5 .175986 .122355 - 13 1 .030120 - - 
2 5 .214958 .234108 0.750 14 1 .048230 - - 
3 3 .164153 .101610 0.905      
4 3 .158390 .073169 0.955 McCaffer& Pettitt     
     0 4 -.020320 .011261 - 
     1 4 .120218 .085000 - 
     2 4 .103058 .038489 0.726 
     3 4 .071488 .018707 0.475 
Table 3: Deficit analysis ANOVA results 
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Case m F df1 df2 p Sim p N mean sd 
25 0.057 0.057 2 3.94 1 49 5.28e-02 5.45e-03 26 0.128 0.170 
37 0.073 0.070 
2 0.511 0.492 3 17.42 2 48 2.06e-06 1.36e-04 
12 0.086 0.088 
37 0.073 0.070 
2 0.511 0.492 
10 0.064 0.055 
Sk
itm
or
e 
1 
4 13.05 3 47 2.51e-06 8.21e-05 
2 0.197 0.168 
23 0.019 0.142 2 10.93 1 74 1.46e-03 2.04e-03 53 0.198 0.241 
23 0.019 0.142 
6 0.702 0.140 3 46.54 2 73 9.31e-14 1.08e-04 
47 0.134 0.162 
23 0.019 0.142 
6 0.702 0.140 
9 0.257 0.241 
Sk
itm
or
e 
2 
4 36.45 3 72 1.93e-14 3.40e-05 
38 0.104 0.125 
32 0.051 0.074 2 2.35 1 55 1.31e-01 3.50e-03 25 0.098 0.153 
47 0.064 0.106 
2 0.295 0.128 3 4.24 2 54 1.95e-02 1.43e-04 
8 0.061 0.133 
32 0.051 0.074 
2 0.277 0.351 
20 0.098 0.113 
Sk
itm
or
e 
3 
4 3.93 3 53 1.32e-02 1.15e-04 
3 -0.022 0.208 
20 0.163 0.161 2 2.26 1 30 1.43e-01 1.42e-03 12 0.083 0.110 
18 0.126 0.115 
2 0.494 0.162 3 11.00 2 29 2.79e-04 7.00e-04 
12 0.083 0.110 
4 0.040 0.140 
14 0.150 0.099 
2 0.494 0.162 
U
SA
 G
ov
t 
4 8.88 3 28 2.70e-04 1.17e-04 
12 0.083 0.110 
21 0.042 0.062 2 3.17 1 46 8.18e-02 2.27e-03 27 0.103 0.147 
21 0.042 0.062 
4 0.353 0.168 3 22.25 2 45 1.92e-07 4.96e-04 
23 0.059 0.091 
21 0.042 0.062 
2 0.261 0.212 
2 0.444 0.075 S
ha
ff
er
 &
 M
ic
he
au
 
4 17.68 3 44 1.13e-06 7.97e-05 
23 0.059 0.091 
69 0.095 0.102 2 13.86 1 99 3.28e-04 8.12e-04 32 0.192 0.157 
69 0.095 0.102 
5 0.371 0.132 3 15.05 2 98 2.00e-06 1.19e-04 
27 0.159 0.140 H
on
g 
K
on
g 
4 15.65 3 97 2.23e-08 3.44e-05 69 0.095 0.102 
 20
5 0.371 0.132 
24 0.132 0.199 
3 0.373 0.115 
2 0.220 0.264 
2 8.25 1 128 4.77e-03 1.98e-03 12
8 0.064 0.073 
2 0.224 0.264 
79 0.054 0.058 3 6.40 2 127 2.25e-03 8.53e-05 
49 0.082 0.090 
2 0.220 0.264 
10
6 0.062 0.066 
2 0.249 0.019 
B
en
ja
m
in
 
4 7.30 3 126 1.49e-04 1.38e-05 
20 0.061 0.086 
17 0.043 0.036 2 12.80 1 76 6.08e-04 1.90e-03 61 0.106 0.069 
30 0.061 0.051 
26 0.134 0.076 3 10.00 2 75 1.41e-04 1.47e-04 
22 0.087 0.053 
17 0.044 0.036 
19 0.089 0.065 
20 0.143 0.076 M
cC
af
fe
r &
 P
et
tit
t 
4 8.60 3 74 5.71e-05 7.15e-05 
22 0.087 0.053 
Table 4:  Deficit grouping analysis 
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Bidder 
Highest 
deficit 
value 
Number 
removed Cut-off m=2 m=3 m=4 Comment 
Skitmore 1 0.859 1 Top value 1.90e-02 1.16e-2 5.05e-03  
Skitmore 2 0.885 10 -0.19 and 0.69 
8.32e-
02 1.28e-02 3.60e-02 
5 top values in 
one group 
Skitmore 3 0.525 0 NA     
USA Govt 0.608 1 Top value 1.73e-01 8.01e-02 7.29e-03  
Shaffer & 
Micheau 0.498 1 Top value 
1.69e-
01 5.85e-03 7.91e-03  
Hong Kong 0.544 5 One outlier 
1.15e-
02 1.70e-03 3.30e-04 
4 high values in 
one group 
between wins 
Benjamin 0.407 0 NA     
McCaffer & 
Pettitt 0.326 2 0.25 
5.15e-
04 5.13e-04 3.39e-04  
Table 5: Outliers 
 
 
 
